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1 Introduction
The evaluation of labor market policies has been an expanding eld in the last decades.
This is partly due to the increasing availability of survey data and computing power,
partly to the recognition that even complex phenomena such as the impact of laws and
regulations on labor markets can be rigorously tested thanks to new empirical method-
ologies, such as the so-called di¤erence-in-di¤erence approaches (also called double dif-
ferences).
In this approach, the outcome (education, access to employment, unemployment rate)
of a treated group, that is, a group subject to a policy change, is compared to a control
group, that is a group made of individuals (or any other unit of observation) as close
as possible to the treated group, but una¤ected by the treatment. The strategy of the
researchers consists in nding a sudden change in policy and build a relevant comparison
group. A recent paper by Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) discusses the issues associated
with the choice of the groups and surveys the literature.
In countries with a federal structure such as the United States or Canada, it is
straightforward to use this technique to evaluate policy changes. Indeed, many laws
are specic to a state (for the US) or a province (for Canada). By comparing states
experiencing a reform to states with no change, it is straightforward to obtain inference
about the causal e¤ects of the reform.1 In contrast, researchers studying French labor
laws typically face cases in which there is no geographical variance in policy changes
since the main law is supposed to apply equally on all the French territory. Therefore,
policy evaluation has to rely on other control groups. A consequence of this universal
character of the law is that the evaluation of working time reduction in France  from 40
to 39 hours in 1982 and then to 35 hours in 1998-2000 has been made more di¢ cult,
in the apparent absence of regional di¤erences.2
In this paper, we exploit a relatively unknown feature of French institutions: the
Northeastern part of France (a region, Alsace, and a sub-region called a département,
1For instance, Card and Krueger (1995) survey their works on the minimum wage. In particular,
they compared the e¤ect of a change in the minimum wage in New Jersey on employment with the
corresponding employment series in a neighbor state, Pennsylvania to infer the absence of a negative
employability e¤ect among teenagers. Autor et al. (2006) have exploited di¤erences in the timing of
reforms of employment protection legislation across states to estimate the employment e¤ect of such
deviations from the at-will doctrine. See also Autor et al. (2005) for a methodological discussion of
the e¤ect of regional cycles on the estimates. Black and Strahan (2001) have exploited di¤erences in
the timing of deregulation of the US banking system in order to infer about rent seeking behaviour
and gender discrimination: they found that deregulation lead gender wage di¤erences to vanish, at the
expense of wages of men who declined after the deregulation.
2Researchers have however genuinely used the size of the rm, as Estevão and Sa (2006) (small rms
were una¤ected by the 35h workweek in 1998-2002), or the part-time/full-time status of employees as
in Crepon and Kramarz (2002) in their evaluation of the reduction in working time in 1982 from 40h to
39h. Other techniques (namely, instrumental variables as in Crépon et al. 2007) have also been used
to get round the problem of the endogeneity of the early transition to 35h for rms.
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Moselle) has di¤erent institutions, and in particular has a di¤erent social security system.
The reason is a purely historical one. Alsace-Moselle as it is called was part of Germany
between 1870 and 1918. During that period, German laws fully applied. After the
signature of the peace treaty in 1918, as a consequence of which Alsace-Moselle was
returned to France, the German code became a local law (Droit Local), that is, a specic
body of legislation mixing up the most favorable elements of the French law code and
the German one.
Interestingly, there have been very few changes over time since 1918: people in Alsace-
Moselle are strongly attached to their legal specicity. The central state, quite strong
in France, has never been able to generate a unied law and even recognized o¢ cially
the Alsace-Moselle specicity in a law text in 1924. Since then, many texts in the Civil
Code and the Labor Code in France are amended with mentions of specic dispositions
for the three départementsof Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin (both of which make up Alsace)
and Moselle (northeastern part of region Lorraine).
We can therefore use this unique historical accident to build di¤erence-in-di¤erence
to evaluate the few reforms implemented in the rest of France di¤erently from Alsace-
Moselle. Alsace-Moselle can therefore be used as a control group, while the rest of France
(which, by an abuse of language and without any meaning, we shall sometimes refer to
France hereafter when there is no ambiguity) can be used as the treatment group.
In particular, we detail here three interesting institutional specicities:
 Reduction in working time: Alsace-Moselle has two days of vacation that do not
exist in France, Easter Friday and Saint-Etienne (December 26). When the famous
35 hours reform was implemented between 1998 and 2002, employers in Alsace-
Moselle rst argued that these two days should be counted as part of the working
time reduction and thus, incorporated in the number of additional vacation days
provided by the 35 hours laws, approximately 18 annually.3 Therefore, Alsace-
Moselle experienced a 10% less stringent reduction in working time.
 Absenteeism and sickness leaves: Alsace-Moselle has a very generous regime for sick
employees. Employers have to pay the full salary for the total duration of absence.
Being sick is not even compulsory in order to benet from the compensation: any
fair cause is acceptable. In contrast, the rest of France has a less favorable regime:
since 1945, social security covers 50% of the previous wage only after the 4th day
of absence. In 1978, a law obliged all employers to give an allowance to sick and
absent employees covering up to 90% of the previous wage, but only after the 11th
day of absence, during 30 days and when the employees have more than three years
of seniority. Therefore, Alsace-Moselle can again be considered as a control group
3Employees could either work 35 hours per week, or keep working 39 hours as usual and get 20
additional vacation days).
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Figure 1: Map of France
and the reform in France can be evaluated using di¤erence-in-di¤erence, or even
triple di¤erences with respect to employees with less than three years of seniority.
 Welfare policies: since 1908, all municipalities in Alsace-Moselle must provide
assistance to impoverished citizens. This system was generalized to all of France
in 1989 under the name RMI (Revenu Minimum dInsertion), which is basically a
subsistence income. Observers argued that the introduction of the RMI allowed
municipalities in Alsace-Moselle to reduce their subsidies by one French Franc for
each Franc of the national subsidy. Therefore, welfare recipients in Alsace-Moselle
were left una¤ected by the RMI reform and hence can be used as a control group.
Of course, one may argue that Alsace-Moselle is di¤erent due to the existence of
other regional specicities. As a matter of fact, there is at least a di¤erence reected
in the following map. Alsace-Moselle, represented by the three départementslabelled
57, 68 and 67 in the top east corner of France, happen to be the only to be ones with a
border with Germany. And this is of course not a random allocation in space!
This has at least one undesirable consequence for researchers: since the pattern of
trade between Germany and France is not homogenous on the French territory but
instead very dependent on the distance to the border as any gravity model predicts, it
is quite likely that Alsace-Moselle is disproportionately a¤ected by German economic
cycle when it di¤ers from the French economic cycle. In such a case, any comparison
of before and afterin Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France will be contaminated by
such spillover e¤ects.
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To solve for this di¢ cult issue, we will need to do several additional comparisons with
una¤ected groups in both Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France, that is, falsication
exercises or equivalently triple di¤erences, by combining the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
results of the a¤ected and una¤ected.
In this paper, we will emphasize the richness and the diversity of the applications
one can develop to better evaluate French labor policies. We present in the next three
sections the three reforms in reverse order: welfare and subsistence income (Section 2),
absenteeism laws (Section 3) and hours worked (Section 4) and the specicities in the
Alsace-Moselle regime. For each experience, we show aggregate results on relevant and
a¤ected variables such as long-term unemployment, employment and unemployment,
absenteeism rate for both Alsace-Moselle and France, and point out to the validity or
invalidity of common wisdom of the e¤ect of each of the three labor policies. In a series of
companion papers, we go deeper in the analysis and are more specic about the various
possible e¤ects of each policy. However, the purpose of the current paper is simply to
expose our idea of the Alsace-Moselle identication strategy and how fruitful it can be.
Section 5 describes other legal specicities in Alsace-Moselle that could be used and
concludes.
2 A welfare policy: the minimum income
In 1989, the French Parliament voted a very important law: any citizen above 25 years
and below some income level became eligible to an allowance amounting to a large frac-
tion of the minimum legal wage. This was called the RMI (revenu minimum dinsertion)
and it was organized by the law n 88-1088, December First 1988. A natural question for
labor economists is whether this welfare program had disincentives e¤ects and generated
more long-term unemployment. This is a tricky question for empiricists given the huge
amount of self-selection and heterogeneity.
By chance for econometricians, a very similar system (aide sociale) at the city
level existed in Alsace Moselle since 1908 (lois locales des 30 mai 1908 et du 8 novembre
1909 )4. For instance, in the main city in Alsace (Strasbourg), the allowance for an
eligible person (single) amounts to 65% of the gross minimum wage (Kintz, 1989).5
After the introduction of the French RMI in 1989, municipalities in Alsace-Moselle
may still give an allowance to poor individuals, but this allowance reduces by the same
token the RMI given by the state (Woehrling, 2002).6 Consequently, after 1988, cities in
4http://www.lexisnexis.com/fr/droit/search/runRemoteLink.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4090933869
&homeCsi=303228&A=0.7883780303835484&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&dpsi=0ARX
&remotekey1=DOC-ID&remotekey2=685_EN_AL0_64685FASCICULEEN_1_PRO_018548
&service=DOC-ID&origdpsi=0ARX&level=1&duRemote=true
5According to Kintz (1989), there are in Alsace-Moselle 13 000 covered persons by the subsidies for
an amount of near 3 millions euros.
6The amount of RMI given is equal to a miminum revenue of approximately 450 euros minus income.
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Alsace Moselle have a direct incentive not to give this aide sociale, as emphasized by
Woehrling (2002). Poor individuals qualify for welfare payments in Alsace Moselle and
the rest of France after 1988, but only in Alsace Moselle before 1988. This provides an
opportunity for a di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis before and after 1988, between Alsace
Moselle and the rest of France, in order to evaluate the impact of the RMI.
2.1 Methodology and results
In this paper, we will present simple averages of unemployment rates in Alsace-Moselle
and the rest of France, before and after 1988. Table 2-1 presents long-term (more than 2
years) average unemployment rates in France and Alsace Moselle, before and after 1989
(for individuals aged more than 25 years old). We used the Enquête Emploi from
1982 to 2002 to calculate the ratio of total number of unemployed people for more than
2 years and aged more than 25 years divided by the total number of active individuals
in the area concerned and the time frame concerned of more than 25 years old.7 Active
individuals are dened as the sum of employed individuals, unemployed individuals (and
soldiers of the military contingent) of more than 25 years old. For example, the long-
term unemployment rate in the rest of France before 1989 (averaged over the period
1982 to 1989) is equal to 3.46 percent as visible in Row (1), Column (1). The numbers
in the Di¤erencerow and column are simple di¤erences. For example, the long-term
unemployment rate is 1.12 percentage point higher in the rest of France than in Alsace-
Moselle.
Simple di¤erences with Alsace-Moselle provide a misleading impression of the impact
of the RMI on long-term unemployment rates. Comparing long-term unemployment
rates in the rest of France to the one in Alsace Moselle after 1989 (an increase in 1.95
percentage point) provides a misleading estimate of the impact of the RMI: the rest
of France might have been systematically di¤erent from Alsace Moselle, due to time
constant unobserved heterogeneity. Similarly, comparing unemployment rates in the
rest of France before and after 1989 (an increase in 1.03 percentage point) provides a
misleading estimate of the impact of the RMI: it might be that the rest of France would
have witnessed an increase in its long-term unemployment rate even without the RMI,
due for example to its poor economic conjuncture at the time.
This is only the di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient of Row (2), Column (2), comparing
long-term unemployment rate in the rest of France to the one in Alsace Moselle, before
and after 1989, captures the causal impact of the RMI. The underlying assumption is
that geographic time constant unobserved heterogeneityis controlled for by comparing
7Number of individuals in a certain category were obtained by summing the appropriate weight ex-
tri. As http://www.jourdan.ens.fr/grenet/Econometrie/Codes.pdf highlights, the Enquête emploi
interviews approximately one over 300 persons. To obtain results consistent with the total population,
one has to weigh results by the variable extri.
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a geographical area with itself, before and after 1989, while common macroeconomic
trends are captured by comparing the rest of France to Alsace Moselle.
The number in the bottom right corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate, com-
paring the rest of France to Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989. It shows that the
long-term unemployment rate increased by 0.83 percentage point due to the implementa-
tion of the RMI. This economically signicant result has to be tested statistically. The
signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient was estimated through the boot-
strap method and we found it to be signicant at the 1% level.8 This seems to support
the inactivity trapargument: individuals may have less incentives to seek for a low-
paying job when it does not increase disposable income by a dramatic amount compared
to welfare payments.
2.2 Falsication exercises
The main assumption, upon which a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation implicitly relies,
is commonly called the common time e¤ects assumption. It means that to inter-
pret causally the di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient, one needs to assume that the treat-
ment and the control group are on the same time trend. In other words, the rest of
France would have evolved the same way Alsace-Moselle did, had the RMI not been
implemented. This is a strong assumption, considering some inherent factors to Alsace
Moselle.
We address this concern by performing two falsication exercises. The intuition of
these falsication exercises is to look at categories of individuals knowingly not a¤ected
by the RMI. These individuals should not show di¤erences in the rest of France compared
to Alsace Moselle, before and after 1989, as they are not a¤ected by the RMI. Any
signicant di¤erence-in-di¤erence would be evidence of di¤erent trends between the rest
of France and Alsace Moselle, violating the common time e¤ectsassumption.
First, we look at short-term unemployment rates. This is dened by the unemploy-
ment rate of individuals less than 2 years out of a job. Unemployment insurance in
France pays a sizeable fraction of the last work income during 2 years. After 2 years,
the amount of unemployment insurance signicantly drops. Individuals less that 2 years
out of a job are thus not likely to qualify for the RMI. Indeed, income has to be less
than a mere 464,05 euros in 20089 to qualify for RMI payments. Table 2-2 shows ex-
actly the same table as Table 2-1, but for short-term unemployment rates. One may see
8A hundred samples were randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-
in-di¤erence coe¢ cient was thus estimated a hundred times. None of the time was the di¤erence-in-
di¤erence coe¢ cient less than 0.
9We collected the RMI threshold for each year from the original legal texts. For example, the RMI
threshold was 2000F or 304.90 euros in 1989.
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19881213&numTexte=
&pageDebut=15547&pageFin=
The RMI threshold was 464,05 euros in 2008.
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that the di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient is a mere -0.13 percentage point. According
to the same bootstrap method, this coe¢ cient is not signicant. From this table, one
may conclude that nothing signicant happened for short-term unemployed individuals,
earning unemployment insurance and thus not eligible for RMI payments, as expected.
Second, we look at individuals between 16 and 25 years old. The RMI only applies to
individuals above 25 years, whereas aide socialein Alsace Moselle applies to individu-
als of more than 16 years old. This means that individuals between 16 and 25 years old
were never a¤ected by the RMI in France, and were always a¤ected by the aide sociale
in Alsace Moselle. There should be no signicant di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient of
unemployment rates for these individuals between the rest of France and Alsace Moselle,
before and after 1989. One may see from Table 2-3 that the di¤erence-in-di¤erence co-
e¢ cient is a mere -0.09 percentage point. According to the same bootstrap method,
this coe¢ cient is not signicant. From this table, one may conclude that nothing sig-
nicant happened for short-term unemployed individuals between 16 and 25 years old,
not a¤ected by the RMI in the rest of France, as expected.
These two falsication exercises conrm that the common time e¤ectsassumption
might hold. They reinforce the condence one may have in the main result that the
RMI caused unemployment.
3 Absenteeism
3.1 Legal texts
The general regime in France of sick-paid leave was organized by a governmental text
from 1945, the Ordonnance n 45/2454 du 19 octobre 1945.10 In the original text, after a
3-days initial period during which no indemnity is paid, half of the previous wage of the
employee was paid by the social security administration with minor seniority conditions
(essentially everyone having worked at least 60 hours in the last three months was
eligible to the indemnity during six months of absence). In 1978, a major law obliged
the employers to introduce a more generous scheme for people with at least three years
of seniority within the rm. The supplementary compensation (called indemnisation
complémentaire) must be paid after the 11th day of the sick leave (the Social Security
compensation still starts after the 4th day). And the supplementary compensation makes
the total payment at the level of 90% of the previous wage during 30 days. After the 30
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=20080117&numTexte=64
&pageDebut=00907&pageFin=00907
The RMI threshold is updated every year, following closely the consumption price index (LHorty
and Parent, 1999).
10http://www.legislation.cnav.fr/textes/ord/TLR-ORD_452454_19101945.htm#art79
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days period, the total payment reverts to 66% of the previous wage.11
In contrast, the local law of Alsace Moselle guarantees: rst, the full salary payment
by the employer in case of any absence independent of ones will - which is a fairly broad
denition; second, no initial period during which no compensation is given: all days
must be paid.12
3.2 Questions
A natural question is whether the generosity of the seek-leave compensation could have
generated a surge in absenteeism. The question can be addressed at two levels: is it
the case that in Alsace Moselle, absenteeism has always been higher, and is it the case
that the transition, in France, to a more generous system, has encouraged absenteeism
relative to Alsace-Moselle where no change took place in 1978 since the existing regime
was uniformly more generous. Finally, the group of employees with less than 3 years of
tenure can be used as an additional control group, since they are una¤ected by the 1978
law. A last exercise we can provide is whether the existence of an additional seniority
right has reduced the incentives to quit the rm.
3.3 Methodology and results
Close to the spirit of the previous section, we will present simple averages of absence
rates in Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France, before and after 1978, to illustrate the
basic intuition of a di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis. Table 3-1 presents percentages of
workers absent last week because of sickness for individuals with more than 3 years tenure
(number of individuals working less than the usual number of hours worked because of
sickness divided by number of employed individuals). For example, the absence rate due
to sickness in the rest of France before 1978 (averaged over the period 1976 to 1978) is
equal to 4.26 percent as visible in row 1, column 1. The numbers in the di¤erencerow
and column are simple di¤erences. For example, the absence rate due to sickness is 0.85
percentage point higher in the rest of France than in Alsace-Moselle, before 1978.
However, as in the previous cases, simple di¤erences between France and Alsace-
Moselle provide a misleading impression of the impact of policy change. The di¤erence-
11Also note that the 30 days period in the 90% regime is augmented by 10 additional days
for each period of 5 years worked in the rm (that is, 40 days in the 90% regime for em-
ployees between 3 and 8 years of seniority, 50 days of seniority is between 8 and 13 years,
etc...). This compensation schem has not changed or only marginally since 1978. See the law at
http://www.ctip.asso.fr/garanties/incap/396.html.
12Article 63 of the Code de Commerce Local and Article 616 du Code Civil Local which became
after the recodication of May First, 2008 of L 1226-24 et L 1226-23 of Code du Travail. E.g.,
http://www.ddtefp57.travail.gouv.fr/inspection/information/droit_local/droit_local.htmSee Grisey-
Martinez and Dagorne (2008, Fasc. 667) for a detailed discussion and a list of clear abuses of this fairly
generous regime.
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in-di¤erence estimate however can capture the causal impact of the absence law, again
because geographic time constant unobserved heterogeneityis controlled for by com-
paring a geographical area with itself, before and after 1978, while common macroeco-
nomic trends are captured by comparing the rest of France to Alsace Moselle.
The number in the bottom right corner then shows that the absence rates due to
sickness increased by 0.88 percentage point, due to the implementation of the 1978 law.
The coe¢ cient is signicant according to the same bootstrap method described in the
previous Section. Thus result supports the view that employees tend at least marginally
to take more sick dayswith a more generous absence law.
3.4 Falsication exercises and robustness
The main assumption, upon which a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation implicitly relies,
is commonly called the common time e¤ects assumption. The rest of France could
have evolved di¤erently Alsace-Moselle did, had the absence law not been implemented.
We address this concern by performing a falsication exercise. We look at employees
with less than 3 years of tenure  those una¤ected by the 1978 regime change in Table
3-2. We expect no signicant di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient for these individuals.
This is indeed the case: the di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient is 0.35 percentage point
and according to the same bootstrap method, it is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
This falsication exercise conrms that the common time e¤ects assumption might
hold and reinforces the condence one may have in the main result that the 1978 caused
some more sick days in France, despite a general decline (see the negative time di¤erences
in the tables) due either to more controls by the administration, the rms themselves,
or to macroeconomic conditions: it is likely that the fear of unemployment which surged
at that time reduced the willingness of exposed employees to abuse from the system.
There is an additional mechanisms through which the 1978 law may operate: it might
be that employees, being more dependent on their seniority rights after 1978 in the rest
of France, would pursue less actively the search of another job where they would loose
all seniority. Table 3-3 shows the proportion of employees looking for another job in
France and Alsace Moselle before and after 1979 (with more than 3 years tenure). The
di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient is a signicant -1.25 percentage point, meaning that
less employees look for a job. This results is further reinforced by Table 3-4. This
table shows the proportion of employees looking for another job with better working
conditions (hours, arduousness, distance) in France and Alsace Moselle before and after
1979 (with more than 3 years tenure, conditional on looking for a job).
It might therefore well be the case that eligible employees with more than three years
of tenure wanted to take advantage of the law by keeping their increasing their tenure
over 3 years and this reduced the average turnover in the French economy.
10
4 The 35 hours reform
In this section we make use of another di¤erence between France and Alsace-Moselle.
There are, in Alsace-Moselle, two holidays unrecognized elsewhere in the country: Saint-
Etienne (Saint Stephens Day, Dec. 26) and Vendredi Saint (Good Friday).
These two days had a particular role when France experienced its large regulation
shock, the reduction in working time (RWT, réduction du temps de travail ou RTT in
french), the switch to a 35 hours workweek between 1998 to 2002. The general regime for
France was as follows. After 2 years of internal negotiation about working time between
1998 and 2000, all rms above 20 employees had to switch, in 2000, to the 35 hours
week or annualize the hours worked and therefore give workers 20 days of holidays. All
rms between 10 and 19 employees had two additional years (until 2002) to switch to
35 hours or to give workers 20 days of holidays. Firms below 9 employees have so far
been una¤ected by the reform.
However, when the RWT took e¤ect, rms in Alsace-Moselle decided that both extra
holidays (Saint Stephen and Good Friday) should be counted as part of the working time
reduction, or les jours de RTT as they are commonly known, because the main text law
organizing the 35 hours did not have any mention about the specicity of Alsace-Moselle.
The application of the RWT has therefore been less favorable in Alsace-Moselle than
in the rest of France, by 16 hours or by two days per year. This di¤erence lasted until
employeesrecourses began to be examined by various legal courts in the subsequent
years. On October 23 2002, the local council (called prudhommes de Metz) stated that
December 26 must be considered a bank holiday as per the special dispositions of the
local laws in Alsace-Moselle, this day cannot be counted as a reduction of working time
(RWT). See in particular Grisey-Martinez for an analysis of several litigations related
to the way les jours de RTT were counted in rms in Alsace-Moselle. The di¤erence in
hours worked before and after was documented in Chemin and Wasmer (2008).
4.1 Employment by travel-to-work area (Zones dEmploi)
The simplest idea is to verify whether a milder application in Alsace-Moselle of the 35
hours between 2000 and 2002 had a di¤erential impact on regional unemployment or
unemployment in local areas. We exploit such data at a quite disaggregate level, the
Zones dEmploi, which are the equivalent of travel-to-work areas: there are 348 such
areas in France for which we have quarterly unemployment data for each of those areas
between 1999 and 2006, for a total of approximately 14400 observations. Among these
348 areas, 17 are in Alsace-Moselle, for a total of 510 observations.
The simplest idea would therefore be to run a regression of the following form:
unemploymentit = i + t + (alsace moselle)  (2000  02)it + uit (1)
where i corresponds to an employment zone , t is the quarter of observation between 1999
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and 2006. i are employment zone xed e¤ects, t quarter xed e¤ects. Alsace-Moselle
is a variable equal to 1 if the employment zone is in the region Alsace or the department
Moselle. (2000-02) is a variable equal to 1 if the year of observation is during the time
of a di¤erential application of the 35 hours. Hence, (Alsace-Moselle)*(2000-02) is a
variable equal to 1 if the employment zone is in Alsace or Moselle in the relevant period.
As additional controls, we also have a variable reecting being in Alsace-Moselle after
2003, for reasons that will appear more clearly in the next paragraphs.
In Table 4-1, we present the di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient  for di¤erent sam-
ples and specications, where standard errors are clustered at the region level.13 Since
unemployment is between 0 and 100 (in percent) a di¤-in-di¤ coe¢ cient of 0.9 in Col-
umn (1) means, in principle, an increase of 0.9 percentage points of unemployment in
Alsace-Moselle relative to France due to a milder application of the 35 hours reform.
This is a surprising coe¢ cient: rst the sign is positive, which would mean that the
35 hours reform did work and reduced unemployment with statistical signicance; and
second its magnitude is large: a 10% di¤erence in the application of 35 hours would
mean, if the e¤ect of 35 hours was linear, that the overall e¤ect of 35 hours is no less
than 9 percentage points of unemployment! This is a number that is by far above any
number put by the promoters of the reform themselves: at most they argued that the
reform had created 400 000 jobs in France, that is only 2 to 3 percentage points.
The problem here is the German cycle: during the period of interest that is after
2000, Germany entered a recession. This had presumably adverse consequences on
unemployment in France and the negative e¤ect was presumably concentrated in the
regions and areas closest to Germany. This is indeed almost surely the case since more
than 70,000 people are transfrontaliers, that is residents of France working in Germany.
As a matter of fact, inspection of the second reported coe¢ cient in Column (1) in Table
4-1 reveals that after 2003, where Alsace-Moselle and France were in principle a¤ected
equally by the 35 hours reform, unemployment in Alsace-Moselle rose by an additional
2 percentage points relative to France.
The next columns (2) to (4) illustrate pretty well the problem generated by local
and regional cycles in our identication strategy. In Column (2), we replicate exactly
the same di¤-in-di¤ analysis for employment zones in Alsace-Moselle further away from
the German border. We only keep the zones in Alsace-Moselle that have no direct border
with Germany and are at least 70km (or 1 hour by car) from the border. We argue that
this restricts the extent of transborder e¤ects. See the note in the table for the selected
regions. The idea is that such zones are probably less a¤ected by the German economic
cycle than employment zones closest to the German border. As it appears in the Table,
this is indeed the case to some extent. The 0.9 coe¢ cient of Column (1) is now smaller
and reaches 0.84.
13There are 22 regions in France. We tried to cluster by travel-to-work area or by departement,
without any major change in the signicance: t-stat did not vary much.
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However, the biggest change occurs when we introduce a di¤erent control group.
Columns (3) and (4) use Lorraine without Moselle as a control group. Lorraine is the
region next to Alsace. It is fairly close to Germany too. But Lorraine without Moselle
(the rest of Lorraine) was not concerned by the two additional days of vacation and
their suppression in 2000. It was however a¤ected by the German cycle to some extent.
The rest of Lorraine is in principle a better control group for Alsace and Moselle, as
for the geographical, historical, cultural, industrial similarities between the two regions.
There are also many transfrontaliers in the rest of Lorraine. Only 29 employment
zones are now included in Column (3). The reported  coe¢ cient in this case is now
half of what it was in Columns (1) and (2). Moreover, it is no longer signicant even at
the 10% level.
4.2 Partial conclusion
The conclusion here is that triple di¤erences, once again, are needed, where an additional
control group is a group of workers una¤ected by di¤erence in the 35 hours reform
between Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France. In Chemin and Wasmer (2008), based on
the French labor force surveys over the relevant period, we used three sets of una¤ected
groups. The rst one was based either on the size of the rm (very small rms (between
0 and 9 employees) were una¤ected, small rms (10 to 19 employees) were a¤ected
by the reform two years after the rms with more employees. The second one was
based on occupations una¤ected by the 35 hours reform, such as self-employed, farmers,
profession libérales like doctors, business owner and merchants. The third one was
based on a careful reading of the 528 collective agreements by sector: a fraction of them
was specic to Alsace-Moselle (Convention Collectives Locales) and a sub-fraction of
them mentioned explicitly the two additional days. Employees in those sectors covered
by these agreements were therefore treated as a control group since it was likely that
the 35 hours shock was identical in those sectors in Alsace-Moselle and in the rest of
France. In all cases, we found that triple di¤erences coe¢ cients are not signicant while
double di¤erence are always signicant. This is suggestive of a marginal or null e¤ect of
the working time reduction reform.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown how simple di¤erence-in-di¤erence coe¢ cient may shed light on
important, and previously unexplored, impact of public policies. The results presented
in this paper are only simple descriptive statistics and the next step is naturally to use
regression models that may control for other important variables.
We contribute to the literature on evaluation of public policies by emphasizing a
methodology based on previously unexplored geographical di¤erences. In France, many
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public policies are left without proper evaluation, simply because most of the policies in
France are implemented nationally. Researchers thus lack appropriate control groups.
This paper shows that accidental historical events in some departments of France may
provide these control groups for some of the relevant policies.
Beyond the di¤erences in social security, we suggest that researchers interested by
the evaluation of other policies should investigate two other major di¤erences between
Alsace-Moselle and France:
 rst, the law on personal bankruptcies. The concept of personal bankruptcies for
all individuals - not only business owners - existed much earlier in Alsace-Moselle
than in France. This potentially allows to test for the e¤ect of individual incentives
to borrow more and therefore become over-indebted;
 second, the law regulating the creation and the administration of associations. It
is more di¢ cult to create an association but they have more autonomy. This may
have a¤ected the accumulation of social capital and other aspects of local life.
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Table 2-1: Long-term (more than 2 years) average unemployment rates
in France and Alsace Moselle before and after 1989 (more than 25 years old)
1982-1989 1990-2002 Di¤erence
Rest of France 3.46 4.49 1.03
Alsace Moselle 2.34 2.54 0.20
Di¤erence 1.12 1.95 0.83***
The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100
samples were randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient
was thus estimated 100 times. None of the time was the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient less than 0. * signicant
at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Figures are long duration (more than 2 years ) average
unemployment rates for individuals more than 25 years old. They represent the ratio of total number of unemployed
people for more than 2 years and aged more than 25 years divided by the total number of active individuals in the
area concerned and the time frame concerned of more than 25 years old. Active individuals are dened as the sum
of employed individuals, unemployed individuals (and soldiers of the military contingent) of more than 25 years
old. The numbers in the Di¤erence  row and column are simple di¤erences. The number in the bottom right
corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate, comparing the rest of France to Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989.
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Table 2-2: Short-term (less than 2 years) average unemployment rates
in France and Alsace Moselle before and after 1989 (more than 25 years old)
1982-1989 1990-2002 Di¤erence
Rest of France 6.98 9.52 2.54
Alsace Moselle 5.67 8.35 2.68
Di¤erence 1.31 1.17 -0.13
The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100
samples were randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient
was thus estimated 100 times. 77% of the time was the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient less than 0. According to
the bootstrap method, this di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is thus insignicantly di¤erent from 0. * signicant
at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Figures are short duration (less than 2 years ) average unem-
ployment rates for individuals aged more than 25 years. They represent the ratio of total number of unemployed
people for less than 2 years and more than 25 years old divided by the total number of active individuals in the
area concerned and the time frame concerned of more than 25 years. Active individuals are dened as the sum of
employed individuals, unemployed individuals (and soldiers of the military contingent) of more than 25 years. The
numbers in the Di¤erence row and column are simple di¤erences. The number in the bottom right corner is a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate, comparing the rest of France to Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989.
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Table 2-3: Long duration (more than 2 years) average unemployment rates
in France and Alsace Moselle before and after 1989 (between 16 and 25 years old)
1982-1989 1990-2002 Di¤erence
Rest of France 5.55 4.52 -1.03
Alsace Moselle 3.81 2.87 -0.94
Di¤erence 1.74 1.65 -0.09
The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100
samples were randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient
was thus estimated 100 times. 72% of the time was the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient less than 0. * signicant
at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Figures are long duration (more than 2 years ) average
unemployment rates for individuals more than 16 and less than 25 years old. They represent the ratio of total
number of unemployed people for more than 2 years and aged between 16 and 25 years divided by the total number
of active individuals in the area concerned and the time frame concerned between 16 and 25 years old. Active
individuals are dened as the sum of employed individuals, unemployed individuals (and soldiers of the military
contingent) between 16 and 25 years old. The numbers in the Di¤erence row and column are simple di¤erences.
The number in the bottom right corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate, comparing the rest of France to
Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989.
17
Table 3-1: proportion of employees absent due to sickness in France and Alsace Moselle
before and after 1979 (more than 3 years tenure)
1976-1978 1979-1989 Di¤erence
Rest of France 4.26 3.36 -0.90
Alsace Moselle 5.11 3.33 -1.78
Di¤erence -0.85 0.03 0.88***
Figures are percentages of workers absent last week because of sickness for individuals with more than 3 years tenure
(number of individuals working less than the usual number of hours worked because of sickness divided by number of
employed individuals). The numbers in the Di¤erence  row and column are simple di¤erences. The number in the
bottom right corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate, comparing the rest of France to Alsace-Moselle, before and
after 1989. The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100
samples were randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient was
thus estimated 100 times. None of the time was the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient less than 0. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 3-2: proportion of employees absent due to sickness in France and Alsace Moselle
before and after 1979 (less than 3 years tenure)
1976-1978 1979-1989 Di¤erence
Rest of France 3.26 2.27 -0.99
Alsace Moselle 3.78 2.44 -1.34
Di¤erence -0.52 -0.17 0.35
Figures are percentages of workers absent last week because of sickness for individuals with less than 3 years tenure
(number of individuals working less than the usual number of hours worked because of sickness divided by number of
employed individuals). The numbers in the Di¤erence  row and column are simple di¤erences. The number in the
bottom right corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate, comparing the rest of France to Alsace-Moselle, before and
after 1989. The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100
samples were randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient was
thus estimated 100 times. In 26% of cases the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient was less than 0. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 3-3: proportion of employees looking for another job in France and Alsace Moselle
before and after 1979 (more than 3 years tenure)
1976-1978 1979-1989 Di¤erence
Rest of France 12.17 6.89 -5.28
Alsace Moselle 8.83 4.80 -4.03
Di¤erence 3.34 2.09 -1.25***
The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100 samples were
randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient was thus estimated 100
times. None of the time was the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient less than 0. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%. Figures are percentages of workers looking for another job with more than 3 years tenure. The numbers in
the Di¤erence row and column are simple di¤erences. The number in the bottom right corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimate, comparing the rest of France to Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989.
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Table 3-4: proportion of employees looking for another job with better working conditions
in France and Alsace Moselle before and after 1979
(more than 3 years tenure, if looking for a job)
1976-1978 1979-1989 Di¤erence
Rest of France 3.68 12.53 8.85
Alsace Moselle 3.84 13.06 9.22
Di¤erence -0.16 -0.53 -0.36***
The signicance of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is estimated through the bootstrap method. 100 samples were
randomly drawn with replacement from the original sample. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient was thus estimated 100
times. None of the time was the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient less than 0. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%. Figures are percentages of workers looking for another job with better working conditions (hours,
arduousness, distance) with more than 3 years tenure, if looking for a job. The numbers in the Di¤erence row and column
are simple di¤erences. The number in the bottom right corner is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate, comparing the rest of
France to Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989.
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Table 4-1: Impact of the milder version of the 35 hours reform in Alsace-Moselle in 2000
on unemployment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quarterly Unemployment Rate by Employment Zone
1999-2006
Treatment group Alsace-Moselle Alsace-Moselle Alsace-Moselle Alsace-Moselle
far from border far from border
Control Group Rest of France Rest of France Rest of Lorraine Rest of Lorraine
(treatment)*(2000-2002) 0.90 0.84 0.50 0.44
(3.54)*** (3.06)*** (1.55) (1.23)
(treatment)*(2003-2006) 2.37 2.07 1.14 0.84
(4.39)*** (3.66) (1.71) (1.18)
Quarter Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Zones Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10440 10170 870 600
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of department. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%. There are 22 regions, 95 departments and 348 Employment Zones. The dependent variable is the Quarterly
Unemployment Rate by Employment Zone. The treatment variable is equal to 1 if the employment zone belongs to one of
the treatment regions. In this table, there are two alternative treatment regions: Alsace-Moselle, or employment zones in
Alsace-Moselle but far from border with Germany. (include: METZ, SARREBOURG in Moselle, SAVERNE-SARRE-UNION,
MOLSHEIM-SCHIRMECK, SELESTAT-SAINTE-MARIE-AUX-MINES, GUEBWILLER, THANN-CERNAY, ALTKIRCH in
Alsace). The control group is either France without Alsace-Moselle, or Rest of Lorraine. Lorraine is the second closest region
to Germany. It includes Moselle. Rest of Lorraine is therefore Lorraine without Moselle. Finally, (Treatment)*post2000 is a
variable equal to 1 if the employment zone is in the treatment region after 2000. (Alsace-Moselle far border) is a variable equal
to 1 if the employment zone is in the region Alsace or the department Moselle but far from the border
This is the Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences variable of interest. post(2000+3rd quarter) is a variable equal to 1 if the year of
observation is after 2000 plus the 3rd quarter. 30 Quarter Fixed E¤ects are included in columns (1), (2) and (3). Only 7
and 11 Quarter Fixed E¤ects are included in Columns (4) and (5), which restrict the sample to observations in 1999-2001 and
1999-2002. 348 Employment zones Fixed E¤ects are included in all columns.
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6 Appendix
We briey document the identication strategy of the 35 hours. This is however not cen-
tral here, but a full and thorough check can be found in a companion paper (Chemin and
Wasmer 2008) using the labour force survey. The microeconomic data used here is in-
stead the Enquêtes permanentes sur les conditions de vie, Indicateurs sociaux doctobre
- Fichier historique 1996-2003.
Table A-1 examines the relationship between the milder reform in Alsace Moselle
in 2000 and workers behaviour. In column (1), the dependent variable is the number
of hours worked per week. Workers in Alsace-Moselle actually worked more than their
counterparts in the rest of France after the reform, relative to before. The theoretical
coe¢ cient is 2 days per year, that is, 0.36 hours per week. This is quite close from
the measured coe¢ cient, which is 0.49, although with marginal signcance. In our
companion paper, we nd, using a larger dataset - the labor force survey - that the
coe¢ cient is actually closer from 0.36 and signicant at the 5% level.
We ran another check with this survey: the dependent variable in column (2) is the
willingness to work less if the salary was to remain constant. The nding is that after
the reform, it is more frequent to nd more workers ready to work less in Alsace Moselle
after 2000 compared to the rest of France. This means that the 35 hours reform was
indeed milder in Alsace Moselle in 2000. This is conrmation that there were di¤erent
e¤ects of the 35 hours reform in Alsace Moselle and in the rest of France in 2000.
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Table A-1: Impact of the milder version of the 35 hours reform in Alsace-Moselle in 2000
on workers (EPCV 1996-2003)
(1) (2)
Number of weekly Would wou prefer to work less
hours worked if your wage did not change?
(Alsace-Moselle)*post2000 0.488 0.0783
(1.37) (2.26)**
Department Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Observations 7642 7594
R-squared 0.02
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of department. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%. The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of hours worked per week. The dependent variable
in column (2) is the willingness to work less if the salary was to remain constant. Alsace-Moselle is a variable equal to 1
if the employment zone is in the region Alsace or the department Moselle. Post2000 is a variable equal to 1 if the year of
observation is after 2000. (Alsace-Moselle)*post2000 is a variable equal to 1 if the employment zone is in Alsace or Moselle
after 2000. This is the Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences variable of interest.
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